ensure a "controlled solution" in southern Africa as a whole. While this study was commissioned by the Ford Administration, it deserves careful study as input to the Carter Administration's policies. For it reveals a great deal about the objectives and methods of the national security bureaucracy, about how the "crisis managers" in every administration approach the kind of "problem" presented by southern Africa today.
Hist ory
However, it is important to put the AASC report in ·the perspective of events since the end of the last decade. Southern Africa has been in turmoil for nearly two decades. Government officials tended for many years to ignore this fact. They a,ssumed, 'llong with more traditional colonialists, that Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were powerful enough to weather the storm. They would survive. Nonetheless, by the end of the 1960s it was becoming clear that the stability of the minority regimes could no longer be taken for granted. It seemed that the liberation movements in the Portuguese territories might actually defeat Portugal's armies over the long run, posing a serious threat to the remaining white regimes.
In 1969 a new and conservative U.S. administration took office. President Nixon's national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, called for a major review of U.S. policy toward the whole area in April of 1969. 6 By the end of the summer of that year the National Security Council had prepared an analysis of the situation and of the options for U.S. policy.6 In early 1970 President Nixon chose the now famous "Option Two," and began to move the United States toward "closer relations" with Portugal, South Africa and, to some extent, Southern Rhodesia. 7 This decision to support the minority regimes was of course kept a closely guarded secret at the time. 8 President Nixon's objective was to strengthen those regimes in their efforts to hold back the liberation movements, thus ensuring stability of some sort.
As a result, the United States began actively intervening in southern African affairs. The new and more active policy failed nonetheless. A few troop transports, helicopters. other weapons, loans, and diplomatic sUPRort were simply not enough to stem the tide. 9 In April 1974 the Portuguese military revolted and overthrew the Caetano regime. Angola, Mozambique, and Guine Bissau were on their way to independence. The whole politico-military situation in southern Africa was transformed. Southern Rhodesia and South Africa suddenly found the liberation struggle carried to their borders. Western interest and concern grew. It was feared that the collapse of the Portuguese empire might start a chain reaction which would topple the South African regime itself, with frightening and far-reaching consequences for Western interests.
By the end of 1974 it seemed to Western analysts that just such a chain reaction was beginning in Angola. The MPLA was gaining ascendancy in the political competition against the FNLA and UNITA.IOIn the view of most Western analysts and of South Africa, an MPLA government was bound to support the liberation struggle, especially in Namibia, throwing the whole subcontinent into turmoil.
The Western reaction to this prospect was a massive, covert action designed to eliminate the MPLA and to bring an FNLA-UNITA coalition to power. 11 The United States, Zaire, South Africa and several other countries coordinated efforts to achieve that end from the beginning of 1975. 12 The initial covert operation, however, failed. In the late autumn of 1975 South Africa invaded Angola in force, sending armored columns up the coast and the interior to seize Luanda, which was already besieged by the FNLA and Zaire regular forces. 13 Secretary of State Kissinger, ignoring the South African invasion and calling for resistance to "Soviet imperialism," appealed to the U.S . Congress for funds to expand U.S. support for FNLA and UNITA.14 The appeal failed, prohibiting the expansion of American aid. The FNLA were quickly pushed out of northern Angola. Within a few months MPLA and Cuban troops had pushed the South Africans across the southern border and back into Namibia.
The United States suffered a humiliating defeat in Angola. It is important to know-why Ford and Kissinger took the risks they did. Their motives at the time shed light on more subtle approaches to intervention developed somewhat later. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in early 1976, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert Ellsworth, indicated that U.S. security interests were at stake in Angola. He made three points at the time:
1. Angola had to be viewed in the context of the crisis in southern Africa: 2. Angola can be used to mount military operations against Namibia and South Africa. 3. the United States did not want such operations to be mounted.1 5 Thus the United States intervened in Angola because it was concerned about the "stability" of South Africa. A former National Security Council aide summarized the U.S. government view not long ago . "According to the CIA," he said, "Angola was 'strategically important' not only for its internal wealth but most of all [emphasis added] for its location adjacent to Namibia (Southwest Africa), from which a radical regime could support an insurgency against South Africa." 16 The failure of paramilitary intervention in Angola did not, however, change American objectives in southern Africa. The reasons which had prompted intervention in the first place seemed as compelling to policymakers as they had ever been. Indeed, with the emergence of an independent and radical Angola, the "stability" of minority rule was more precarious than ever. 18 In a major speech during his trip to Africa, he outlined a policy which seemed much more supportive of the goals of the liberation movements. He indicated that the United States had accepted the principle of majority rule for Zimbabwe and Namibia, stating that the U.S. would work actively to help achieve it. He did not press the question of majority rule with respect to South Africa itself, but he expressed hope for a "peaceful end to institutionalized inequality," which he considered to be "in the interest of all South Africans."19 The major emphasis in his speech, however, was on the need to accelerate economic development in southern Africa. 20 He promised an extensive new U.S. aid program for the African continent and immediate U.S. assistance in promoting development in southern Africa.
Secretary Kissinger stated that he was particularly concerned with the needs of Zimbabwe and Namibia. Those countries were still under colonial ru1e, but the United States was prepared to begin helping them "once concrete movement toward self-determination is underway."21 Thus the United States was proposing to intervene in the situation on South Africa's perimeter even before minority rule was ended. Kissinger proposed immediate programs for manpower training, rural development, advanced technology and modern transportation for both Zimbabwe and Namibia. 22 He indicated that the U.S. government had already requested funds from Congress for this purpose and that it was requesting contributions by other countries and international donors.23
The Kissinger proposals were really rather extraordinary. They put the U.S. in the position of proposing assistance to illegitimate governments in the midst of a major continental crisis. The objective, of course, was still to ensure the continuation of Western power and influence in the area. But power was to be asserted through the ' purse rather than by the gun. The U.S. hoped that by "accelerating economic development" it could ensure a "peaceful evolution" toward majority rule. A "peaceful evolution" in turn would help to ensure the emergence of "moderate leaders" at the time of independence. And such leaders wou1d wish to maintain close ties with Western countries and so keep that "growing instability" which troubled the West in check. 24 "Moderate rule" in Zimbabwe and Namibia, of course, would also contribute to peace and security for South Africa. By shaping events in the periphery through "peaceful means," it seems that Kissinger hoped to reconstitute a system of buffer states which would protect South Africa's borders.
Consequently, the Lusaka speech of April 27 did not really represent a major departure from previous U.S. policies. It merely represented an adjustment to the new realities of power and the pursuit of the same objectives by new means.
Study by AASC However, to set in motion such a plan, the government needed information. There are very few specialists on southern Africa in the U.S. government, and the obvious place to turn for information was the universities. In August 1976 the Agency for International Development signed a contract with the African-American Scholars Council for a major report on the future of Zimbabwe and Namibia. The AASC was founded for the purpose of channeling government research contracts to black American 3B scholars. Thus it could at once marshall scholarly resources and involve the black American community in the development of Mr. Kissinger's policy of "enlightened assistance" to emerging countries in southern Africa.
The August contract provided for a payment, on a cost reimbursable basis, of $340,000 for the Zimbabwe-Namibia study.25 The contract called for the hiring of six senior academics for six months and for a total of 84 man-months of work. The bulk of the money, $222,000, was not for direct salaries but for consultants and subcontracts. Interim reports were to be ready in October and November of last year. Final reports on both Zimbabwe and Namibia were due in early 1977.
It was clear from the beginning that AID was interested in more than academic analyses. The original contract called f'Of the AASC to produce not a report but an "Assessment of Programming Requirements -Zimbabwe and Namibia." And in preliminary conversations in Washington in early August" AID officials stressed that the project was designed to help move the Lusaka initiative.26 The AID did want to use the resources of various ar' ea specialists and of various disciplines to analyze the "problems" which would arise in the period of transition to majority rule, but it was interested above all in policy. The principal objective of the AASC study was to be to formulate explicit options for U.S. government policy.
The AID selected Dr. Samuel Adams to head the project within the African-American Scholars Council. Dr. Adams had been deputy chief of the AID Africa Bureau and had considerable experience in Africa. Three academics from the white university establishment were selected as the principal directors of rese;lIch for the project. The first was Robert Rotberg of MIT, who was to undertake the overall political analysis. Elliot Berg of the University of Michigan was selected to direct the necessary economic research. Stewart North of the University of Houston was to analyze the human resource issues in the study.27
The first strange feature of the project became evident almost immediately. AID had meant to involve the black American community in the study. With the exception of Dr. Adams, however, the principal researchers were all white. The project staff seemed to come exclusively from the AID and related institutions. One black American slated to play an important role in the project at its inception was Dr. Walton Johnson of Rutgers, a man with some knoweldge of southern Africa who was meant to be Dr. Adams's assistant. Dr. Johnson, however, resigned from the project at a very early stage. 28
Other aspects of the project were controversial from the beginning. There are still many people in Washington and in the universities who are aware of the way that AID used scholarly work before and during the Indochina debacle. Government agencies had commissioned hundreds, perhaps thousands, of detailed studies of Vietnamese, Lao, and Thai society simply in order to find the means of controlling or subjugating them.29 It was therefore natural to be suspicious of the project from the start. Some critics asked whether the real purpose of the project was to find the means of bypassing the liberation movements and therefore of subverting the liberation struggle itself. In fact when repr, e$entatives of the Zimbabwean movements and SWAPO met with the researchers and were asked about their future economic plans, they refused to cooperate, citing the fear of U.S. government intervention. 30
By late summer, AASC project staff and consu1tants had begun to gather materials and to interview experts familiar with southern African problems. The staff made available a paper describing the scope of the project's investigations which raised a storm of controversy. It seemed that the project researchers were being directed to define the levers of power which could be used by those outside Zimbabwe and Namibia to control the pace and pattern of change.
For instance, the "principal investigator" dealing with political questions was asked to assess "the attitudes of government and liberation leadership in southern Africa" toward the problems arising from the transition to majority rule. He was also asked to assess "their openness to and attitudes towards U.S. policy and programmes related to transition." He was asked "the interests other nations might have in facilitating the transition to majority rule" and "any possible U.S. role associated therewith." He was asked as well to survey the assets which the U.S. may have available to it in implementing "its" policies towards Zimbabwe and Namibia. AID also requested that he assess "the willingness of political, social, university, nonprofit, foundation, corporate and other U.s. institutions or groups in the U.S. to support or assist, U.S. Government programmes and policies [emphasis added 1 related to the transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia."31
Thus there was growing criticism of the AASC project in the academic community, in Congress and at the United Nations even before the researchers had begun to write their preliminary reports. And the criticisms made were aired in the press. AID officials, and Dr. Adams in particular, went out of their way to meet with scholars and others in an effort to explain what the project was doing. It must be said that, as those discussions proceeded, suspicion deepened.
By the late autumn the AASC had begun to receive the first drafts of the various papers. The drafts on Namibia dealt with a variety of subjects, from politics and health through economic growth and education. The drafts on Zimbabwe covered a similar range of topics, but with much more attention to the details of economic organization.
By November 15 the project had also produced two interim reports, one for each country, bringing together the preliminary findings of the AASC staff and its consultants. Taken together these drafts presented a "map" of the structure of society in each country.
Context of the Report
It is important to stress the fact that the AASC study was being drawn up in a particular . context. In the summer of 1976 guerrilla wars were spreading through Zimbabwe and Namibia. South Africa and the Smith regime spoke of "independence" for Namibia and of "majority rule" in Zimbabwe. But, as events have proved, they were doing little more than trying to buy time. Neither South Africa nor the Rhodesian illegal iegime had any intention of surrendering power to the liberation movements. And Western governments, which were giving diplomatic al).d other kinds of support to both regimes, wer~.exceedingly worried about the possibility of the liberation movements coming to power tluough their own efforts by defeating the South African and Rhodesian armed forces in the field. 32 Governments which achieved power through their own efforts would have no obligations to others, and certainly not to the Western countries. Mr. Kissinger strongly suspected that governments which achieved power through armed struggle would be "radical,"33 and radical governments would threaten Western interests in the whole of southern Africa. 34 If Zimbabwe and Namibia slipped out of the Western sphere of influence (as had already happened in Mozambique and Angola), U.S . policymakers feared serious repercussions, not only in South Africa but in other parts of Africa as well. The crucial issue in the second half of 1976 for the U.S. government was whether new political formations, as a result of majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia, would eventually lead to a break with the West and a shift in the international balance of power in Africa between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Therefore, objectively, U.S. policy is opposed to the movement toward socialism in Africa.
For the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, however, the crucial issue was whether lIpartheid and colonialism in those countries could be ended. In fact, they saw the issue as far more difficult and complex than many Western observers. Western commentators often speak of the "problem" of colonialism in these countries as essentially one of eliminating "racial discrimination."35 This is quite superficial; the singular emphasis on racial conflict to the exclusion of attention to economic exploitation and political subjugation is 'misleading. The whole structure of society in Zimbabwe and Namibia is based upon and organized around the exploitation of the majority by a settler minority. It is not possible to pass legislation, as may have been the case in the United States, and to end legal "racial discrimination" by desegregation. The inequalities which are so marked in southern Africa are deeply rooted in the political economy of racism there. It is plain to any objective observer that an improvement in the conditions of life for Africans can come only through fundamental change in the social and economic systems.
Yet that is precisely what many Western governments fear. It appears that AID was really asking the AASC project to draw up plans which would help Western governments to find ways to block any kind of radical change in Zimbabwe and Namibia. These plans were indirect rather than direct.
Criticisms of the Report
While the real issue was whether farreaching economic and social changes were needed in Namibia and Zimbabwe, the AASC drafts simply avoided any discussion of such a controversial subject. They blandly assumed, implicitly, that change would take place more or less within the framework of existing institutions in Zimbabwe and Namibia. For instance, they avoided mentioning the possibility that the future governments of those countries might curtail the activities of transnational corporations since those corporations would be seen as the instruments by which Zimbabwe and Namibia had been forced into economic dependence upon the West. Majority rule governments may well come to the conclusion that real change can be realized in their countries only by dismantling the present form of economic organization there. 36 Certainly any future government of Zimbabwe or Namibia should be free to make such a decision. Yet that whole realm of possibilities is entirely ignored in the AASC project.
There was a second marked bias in the draft and interim reports. The AASC researchers did not look at Zimbabwe and Namibia as nations but as regions inhabited by antagonistic tribes who were unlikely to agree on common policies after independence. Indeed, it was str,ongly suggested that there was a real possibility of civil war in both countries after independence. This is, of course, a traditional colonial view, and was used in the past against African and other peoples subjugated by the European powers.
To take an example, we may cite Rotberg's initial draft on "Namibia: Politics, Ecology and Society."37 At a moment when it was clear that Namibians were increasingly strong and united as a nation, Rotberg stressed that "The historic rivals of the Ovambo are the Herero .... They will smart under Ovambo preeminence and find themselves in an essentially powerless position after independence."38It seemed that researchers were being asked to assess "the potential for ethnic strife" in order that outsiders might find the means of using one group against another for their own ends. 39 The circulation of the draft papers and the interim reports brought an intensification of the criticism which had previously been directed at the AASC. Project researchers did not openly say that the United States must find ways to increase its influence and weaken the liberation movements in order to hold change within "tolerable" limits. Their papers and reports, however, certainly pointed in that direction.
It must, be _ said ;in all fairness that this was not true of all the papers prepared by consultants. Some of the drafts were scholarly and sympathetic to the interests of the majority population. Some openly questioned the very idea of an active U.S. intervention in southern African affairs.
However, senior AASC staff and researchers clearly imposed a political line in shaping the overall reports. A contract for an "Assessment of Programme Requirements" excluded any consideration of the idea that an interventionist policy might be wrong and/or misguided. One consultant was told that a paper submitted, which questioned the basic line of the AASC project, was not "acceptable."
In March 1977 the AASC issued its final report on the Zimbabwe-Namibia transition project. 40 The first two chapters of the final report summarized the information and analysis set out in the drafts and interim reports. They described the basic "facts" of the present situation in Zimbabwe and Namibia as seen from the perspective of conventional social science in the Western countries.
This perspective assumes that the status quo is in essence unchangeable and satisfactory. Changes within the framework of existing institutions may be desirable, but they are limited changes. Thus the implicit assumption of the report was that the close relations between the Western countries and Zimbabwe and Namibia would somehow continue.
The last two chapters of the report reviewed the "problems" of transition and development in both countries and revealed the limitations of the whole approach used in the study. For, given the assumptions of the researchers, the only "problems" which could be perceived required no more than adjustments or reforms in the existing system of institutions.
The final report did not discuss the kinds of problems which have become a familiar parJ of the international debate on the new world economic order. It ignored the problem of mobilizing to end poverty. It ignored the problem of eliminating the excessive privilege of the white community. It ignored the problems connected with external dependency. In short, it gave little indication of any concern on the part of the authors for the forging of a new and free society in southern Africa.
Among the "problems" to be remedied piecemeal, within the existing national structures, were the following: how to ensure the flow of foreign capital; how to ensure some stability in the administrative system; how to train an adequate number of African managers; how to prevent a necessary rise in African wages from disrupting the whole economy. (The latter was an insoluble dilemma as stated in the final report.) Other topics were: how to ensure the proper planning and development of "the" education system; and how to carry out land reform without causing too large an efflux of white farmers and too great a loss of foreign exchange earnings (another insoluble dilemma).
The last two s:hapters also contained specific suggestions for U.S. government assistance to Zimbabwe and Namibia during the process of transition. With respect to Zimbabwe, for instance, the report suggested the U.S. might render assistance by undertaking the following programs: 41 Public Commerce -small business assistance; establishment of credit facilities. The implementation of a significant number of such programs would obviously lead to extensive U.S. government involvement in Zimbabwean affairs at a crucial point in that country's history. A foreign government deploying large amounts of money and personnel in the institutions of another society, particularly a poor one, is bound to be able to exert a certain control over or restraint upon important decisions made in that society, especially at the government level.
Conclusions
What, then, did the final report of the AASC mean?
Part of the answer may be found by clarifying a prior question, namely: did the AASC report recommend a particular policy for the United States in southern Africa? The authors of the report argued in the introduction that their position was a neutral one, and by implication an "objective" one. The report, they said, "does not aim to recommend United States southern Africa policy."42 However, the United States government, and other governments, in the midst of wars raging in both Zimbabwe and Namibia, were insisting that majority rule should come through "peaceful change" and were making every effort to ensure that it came that way. In such a context, the report, which was sponsored and funded by the U.S. government, could scarcely be seen as an argument against U.S. involvement in Zimbabwe and Namibia. It was, in fact, merely an extension of the commitment of the U.S. government to achieve one particular kind of "solution" in those countries, a gradualist "solution" through "peaceful change."
In the context of the debate going on at the time it is therefore impossible to construe the final report as anything but a manual on how to implement the policy of trying to impose that "solution," for it was clear that the actors in the southern African drama were not by themselves acting to ensure the peaceful transfer of power to the African majority.
Finally, then, we may ask what the policy recommended by the AASC meant. Can it justifiably be claimed that the AASC report was part of an effort to block radical or farreaching change in Zimbabwe and NaPlibia?
We believe that that claim is justified. For, as has already been indicated, the whole analytical approach of the project was onesided. The project moved from a set of unstated assumptions to a conclusion, while attempting to maintain an air of reasonableness and objectivity. The implicit premises of the project were the following:
1. Zimbabwe and Namibia are already closely linked to the Western countries and to South Africa;
2. the Western countries must maintain their dominance in the periphery of southern Africa in order to maintain it in South Africa itself;
3. accelerated economic growth within the existing regional system will bring an end to the kinds of inequality created by colonialism and apartheid;
4. there are no meaningful options for policy in Zimbabwe and Namibia except 3 above; 5. 3 above will lead not only to the end of, or significant reductions in, inequality, but also to "progress."
Taken together these assumptions lead ineluctably to one conclusion: that the interests of the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia would be well served by the maintenance of existing links with South Africa and the Western countries and by the acceleration of economic growth within that framework of relationships. This conclusion is never explicitly stated in the final report, but economic growth within the framework of capitalism or a "mixed economy" is the only kind of growth and change talked about in the report. This type of economic climate, of course, is one in which investment and trade by U.s. transnational corporations would flourish.
The report arrives at its conclusion by insinuation, not by asserting its rightness but by excluding any consideration of other arguments and options for Zimbabwe and Namibia. Such methods, of course, seek to lead a reader or listener to particular conclusions by manipulation rather than by reasoning. The fact that the AASC final report is manipUlative in this sense is clear comment on the faith which policymakers have in their assumptions and arguments about southern Africa policy. Such methods are used because no one dares to explain the real reasons for, and the real meaning of, the policy of "peaceful change" now being urged upon Africa by Western governments.
